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Truth-bearers or Truth-makers?*,
Laura Perini
One way visual representations might function in scientific reasoning
is to convey content that is true or false, analogous to making a claim.
An alternative way that visual representations might function is as an
object that may make statements true or false, but is not itself true or
false, analogous to a scientific model. In this paper I evaluate the most
recent and extended defense of this laer position and show that the
case study involved does not in fact support the view that the diagrams
discussed function as truth-makers rather than truth bearers.
Do scientific visual representations bear truth or merely make statements
true? In a prior work I argued that visual representations can bear truth
(Perini 2005). I thought it was important to demonstrate this capacity in
order to convince philosophers that visual representations play crucial roles
in scientific reasoning. Scientists use visual representations to convey evidence
and present conclusions in research publications: visual representations seem
to be playing roles analogous to premises and conclusions in an argument.
The main critical response to my view has not been dispute over the claim
that visual representations can bear truth; instead there have been efforts to
show that there is reason to doubt that the capacity to bear truth is relevant
to understanding what visual representations contribute to science. Meynell
(2008) suggests broadly that any analysis that directs our aention to truth will
somehow lead us astray. I disagree: the kind of analysis involved in showing that
pictures can bear truth has yielded important insights, including results that
show that prevailing intuitions about pictures are wrong (Perini 2010). Goodwin
(2009) presents a more specific response, arguing that visual representations
in science function in roles that do not depend on their capacity to bear
truth, acting sometimes like descriptive names and sometimes like models.
This suggestion is well worth exploring, since scientists use a great variety
of images, across a significant range of contexts (below I discuss one type of
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image that does not usually function to “express a claim,” as Goodwin 2009, 374
puts it). The alternative that Goodwin advances in his analysis of how visual
representations contribute to scientific reasoning is that visual representations
function like scientific models.1 Goodwin draws on Ronald Giere’s view that
visual representations are of the same representational type as models. In
discussing maps, Giere claims that they are “physical objects, for example, a
piece of paper with colored lines and spaces on it. It does not, therefore, make
sense to ask whether a map is true or false” (Giere 2006). Giere is an advocate
of the semantic view of scientific theories and, from that perspective, the claim
that visual representations function in the same way as scientific models has
the advantage of bringing scientific images within the purview of a high-level
account of scientific knowledge.
According to the semantic view, scientific knowledge is embodied in models,
which make statements true, but are not themselves true or false. The semantic
view can be cashed out in alternative ways; some authors have logical models
in mind, others work with more broad and intuitive views about models.
Thomson-Jones (2006) argues that these alternatives can be understood as
different views about the sense in which a model is a truth maker. The first
perspective involves a very strong form of truth-making where models provide
an interpretation for a formal language aswell as a universe of discourse inwhich
statements (so interpreted) are true or false. The second involves truth-making
in a weaker sense, a view which Thomson-Jones refers to as “description-fiing.”
On this view, scientific models are objects that play representational roles and
natural language statements about the models may be true or false, but the
models don’t provide an interpretation of that language in the way that logical
models do for the formal language associated with a logical model. Giere and
Goodwin are talking about models in this second sense: a scientific model is
an object, about which certain claims are true and others false, depending on
whether or not the model fits the description conveyed by the claim. Goodwin
is explicit that, in reasoning with a model, a modeler draws inferences about the
model as an object and then infers facts about the relevant part of the world
from there.
I would like to explore further the idea that visual representations in science
function as truth-makers, but not as truth-bearers. It is trivially true that
any visual representation will make some claims true; each will fit a correct
description of its visible form. The question is: will analyzing scientific visual
representations as the kinds of things that can be true or false generally be
inappropriate? The key issue here is the extent to which we can understand
1 Goodwin argues that some chemical diagrams function like descriptive names, on the grounds
that they carry the same information conveyed by IUPAC formula names—information about
the atoms and bonds in a chemical compound. Goodwin does not show that they play the role
of names in actual scientific reasoning.
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the role of scientific visual representations in the way that Giere and Goodwin
articulate: as objects, rather than as analogous to representations that convey
propositional content, like sentences.
Goodwin aims to show that visual representations do not mainly function
as truth-bearing representations in scientific reasoning. He discusses several
diagrams of chemical formulas to support this position, working with a case
study from organic chemistry in which an important result depended on
comparison of the possible structures of two chemical isomers—compounds
that have the same atomic components, but whose atoms are arranged in
different bonding configurations from one another. The isomers both consist
of a six-carbon ring with methyl groups aached to the first and third carbon
atoms of the ring. In the trans isomer one of the groups is positioned above the
ring, and one below; in the cis isomer both of these carbon groups are on the
same side of the ring. Experimental work has shown that these isomers have
different boiling points and also that, for similar compounds, the more stable
isomer has the lower boiling point. The cis isomer has both of the bulky methyl
groups on the same side of the carbon ring, and so it was thought that it would
involve greater steric hindrance than the trans isomer, so the first hypothesis
was that the trans isomer would be the more stable of the two. However, work
with three-dimensional models of the isomers led to the opposite conclusion.
Goodwin describes how moving the parts of the models of each isomer allowed
for the observation of effects that influence the overall structure and that this
allowed for inferences about the relative chemical stability of each isomer. First,
the model of the cis isomer was put into configurations in which the parts of the
model corresponding to methyl groups stayed quite far apart from both each
other and from hydrogen atoms aached to the ring. A similar configuration
could not be achieved by manipulating the model of the trans isomer. The next
step was to draw inferences about the part of the world the model represented:
because the isomers share structural features with the respective models, the
scientists could infer that the cis isomer is the more stable of the two and thus
the one with the lower boiling point.
Goodwin focuses on the use of models and on the importance of
manipulating those material objects and observing the results. He concludes
that the model’s primary role in scientific reasoning is to function as an
object that certain statements are true about, rather than functioning as a
representation that is playing a role analogous to the linguistic expression of
a claim. For Goodwin, the fact that the model is an object that shares properties
with its referent is key; he concludes that the role of the model is to be a
truth-maker, not a truth-bearer.
Goodwin’s thesis that diagrams function as truth-makers rather than
truth-bearers depends on their functioning in the same way as the models
in his case study. Do they? Goodwin presents a pair of diagrams in a figure
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which labels them as the lowest energy configuration of the cis and trans forms,
respectively (see Goodwin 2009, Figure 3, second row). These diagrams represent
the volumes of ring-aached components of the isomers with broken circles. The
diagrams are not standing in “as objects” in the way that models do. Goodwin
describes three-dimensional models whose parts can be rotated in space. They
can be used to discover the conformation with the least crowding among parts
of the model. That discovery, along with the assumption that the structure
of each model resembles one of the isomers and the connection to chemical
theory (the effect of steric hindrance on the stability of a compound), supports
the conclusion that the cis isomer will be more stable than the trans isomer.
However, that is the reasoning that can be accomplished with models with
movable parts. All the diagrams Goodwin discusses are static markings on a
flat surface. The positions of their parts can’t be manipulated. The viewer can
imagine a three-dimensional object aer viewing the diagram, and then imagine
what that three-dimensional object would look like if its parts were rotated.
Then they could use the same reasoning that was applied to their observations
of the actual three-dimensional models aer they were manipulated. So it seems
possible that diagrams could be used to achieve the same discovery that models
facilitated. However, this does not show that the diagram is functioning like the
model. If this is how the diagrams are used, then somemodel-based reasoning is
involved, but the diagram itself is not functioning in the same way as the model
in that reasoning process; instead, the imagined compound functions like the
model.
The diagrams that Goodwin claims function like models actually work to
support the conclusion about the relative stability of the two isomers because
they represent the particular structure of each isomer. Those diagrams are
presented with captions labeling each as the lowest energy configuration. This
is in sharp contrast with the reasoning involved with the model, in which
one manipulates the model and concludes, based on observing alternative
conformations, which isomer has the lowest energy. In the diagram, large and
small dashed circles are used to convey information about the relative volumes
occupied by hydrogen atoms and methyl groups. There is nothing about this
case that indicates that these diagrams are not functioning to make a claim
about the structures of the isomers; were we to discover that hydrogen occupies
a larger volume than a methyl group, I believe it would be appropriate to judge
the diagram inaccurate or false. Goodwin’s discussion of models has raised
an important suggestion about how visual representations might function in
science, but he has not shown that diagrams function like objects rather than as
claim-making representations in this particular case.
As I mentioned above, there are circumstances in which scientific images
are used like objects in the sense Goodwin claims—where it’s their capacity
to make certain statements true rather than a capacity to bear truth that
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maers in scientific reasoning. For example, when scientists investigate protein
structure they oen use images produced by the interaction between a protein
crystal and X-rays. The crystal diffracts the rays, which interfere or reinforce
one another, producing a complex paern of spots. There is lile to no visually
accessible resemblance between the spot paern and the shape of the protein.
To derive information about protein structure from the diffraction paern,
scientists measure the location and intensities of spots. That yields numerical
representations of the form of the image, which are then subjected to extensive
analysis in order to generate a model of the protein structure (see Perini 2012).
However the fact that in some circumstances scientists use images in ways
that are best described as using the image as an object (or description-fier),
doesn’t imply that most scientific images are used in this way. For example,
understanding diagrams that are presented as conclusions as such offers a way
to understand the reasoning scientists present that is consistent with scientists’
concerns. Authors worry about whether they are correct or not, whether or not
their conclusion is conveyed through an equation, a statement, or a diagram.
Referees evaluate whether such conclusions are adequately supported by the
evidence.When evidence is presented in diagrammatic format, referees evaluate
whether it adequately supports the conclusion of the paper.2 In the context of
research articles and talks, visual representations frequently do seem to play the
role of making claims, rather than being presented as objects that merely make
other representations true.
I would like to end by emphasizing that we are at a preliminary stage in
understanding how visual representations contribute to the growth of scientific
knowledge and that it is valuable to explore a variety of kinds of roles that they
might play and a variety of issues that might be relevant to understanding how
they play those roles. At a recent seminar on visualization in biology Robert
Skipper (2012) noted that whether or not the image is an idealization or an
abstraction may be important for understanding why the image is used and the
reasoning involved. Evaluation in terms of accuracy and precision is oen more
apt than whether a visual representation is true or false. Finally, the variety
of both images and their contexts of use in science provides good reasons to
investigate their use in roles that have lile or nothing to do with a capacity to
bear truth. For all these projects, close aention to images in their context of use
is crucial to expanding our understanding of how they are involved in scientific
reasoning.
2 For discussion of a case where one diagram is presented as evidence for another, see L. Perini,
Diagrams in Biology, Knowledge Engineering Review (Forthcoming).
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